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Abstract 
We  aim  to  model  the  "optimal"  choice  on  internal  versus  external  innovation  for  value 
capture of different-sized firms, in the context of multi-level bargaining. We find that size 
differentials  are  a  major  determinant  for  the  choice  in  hand.  We  derive  implications  for 
"closed"  versus  "open"  innovation  approaches,  and  we  discuss  managerial  practice, 
limitations and possible extensions. 
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1. Introduction 
The role of knowledge in society is one of the most significant issues in economics 
and management. The governance of knowledge has been at the forefront of debate since the 
emergence of modern economics and management. In Adam Smith (1776), specialization and 
the  division  of  labour  within  firms  (the  "pin  factory")  were  viewed  as  sources  of 
organizational knowledge (invention by labour), and productivity. Hayek (1945) emphasized 
the institutional division of labour between markets and (central) planning, in an attempt to 
explain  the  "optimal"  use  of  dispersed  knowledge  in  society.  He  felt  that  decentralized 
markets  were  better  than  centrally  planned  hierarchies  (states)  for  the  exploitation  of 
dispersed knowledge. Schumpeter (1942), Penrose (1959) and Chandler (1962) stressed the 
importance of large private hierarchies (firms), in specialising in the production and use of 
knowledge for production for a profit. Internalising the forces of "creative destruction" has 
been a dominant theme of these authors. Such internalisation in the form of internal R&D 
departments within large firms (or the "closed innovation" approach), has been, and it largely 
remains, the dominant approach to the creation and leverage of R&D by large firms.
ii This 
approach helps explain earlier "paradoxes" such as the failure by firms to capture value from 
their innovations, when these innovations were not adding value to the core activities of firms 
(Chesbrough, 2006). 
Failures such as these complement similar failures by firms to capture value from 
their  innovations,  when  they  lack  size  and/or  complementary  skills  and  capabilities  --  a 
problem documented by Teece (1986). An example is the case of EMI's invention of the CT 
scanner. EMI's decision to leverage internally the invention of the CT scanner by undertaking 
greenfield FDI in the US, instead of undertaking a partnership with a firm with a history in 
the  market  and  (thus)  complementary  capabilities  and  assets  such  as  Siemens,  has  been 
suggested by Teece (1986) as a reason for EMI's failure to capture (more) value from its   4 
innovation. Another possible alternative for EMI might be to acquire another firm. This has 
been  Kodak's  successful  approach  in  acquiring  requisite  knowledge  and  capabilities  for 
digital photography, Grant (2005). In the event, competitors who possessed complementary 
assets were able to profit more out of EMI’s innovation.  
The flipside of the above problem is the possibility of capturing value from someone 
else's innovation as it is now widely recognised among practitioners that "most innovation 
happens elsewhere", that  most innovation comes from the  market, employees, customers, 
suppliers, competitors and citizens. An emerging question in this context would be whether, 
when and how to leverage other firms innovations to capture value. In recent years, it would 
appear that a number of firms in some sectors, undertake sufficient R, in order to be able to 
appreciate other firms' R, with an eye to acquiring it and then to proceeding with D. This 
"externalisation" of R is part and parcel of the currently popular "open innovation" approach. 
This approach is pursued by large companies in sectors such as IT and pharmaceuticals, but 
also by firms like Procter & Gamble and Apple. The recent success of the iPod seems to be 
explicable in terms of the use by Apple of its internal portfolio of innovations, alongside 
external ones, combined with Apple's complementary skills and capabilities for design and 
for appreciating (future) consumer needs, see The Economist, June 4, 2007. 
The  historical  move  from  "open  innovation",  observed  by  many  scholars  and 
summarised in the main by Henry Chesbrough (2006) begs the fundamental question whether 
and when should a firm choose externalisation versus internalisation of innovation, as well as 
the  related  questions  which  are  the  critical  determinants  of  this  choice.  In  addition,  an 
important question that precedes the above, concerns the underlying objective. While, for 
example, in Adam Smith, Joseph Schumpeter and Edith Penrose the objective is economic 
efficiency (system-wide value creation), for the case or firms the objective is profit, and 
therefore  value  capture.  The  two  need  not  be  the  same,  as  documented  for  example  by   5 
Penrose (1959), and Baumol (1991). Our focus here is on profit making firms and we ignore 
the issue of system-wide efficiency and (thus) system-wide value creation, (see AMJ 2007, 
for extensive discussions on value creation and value capture). Arguably the most important 
consideration in the above context is firm size. Large firms with a past record and R&D 
infrastructure, as well as with the possession of (and/or capability to develop or acquire fast), 
complementary skills and capabilities, will be in a stronger position than smaller firms to 
capture value from innovation (theirs or that of others) --- raising the question how best to 
compete.  For  smaller  firms,  such  as  innovative  start-ups,  things  are  likely  to  be  more 
complicated. They must decide whether to compete or to cooperate with large players, and on 
what terms. The work of Gans and Stern (2003) shows that this will depend on the degree of 
imperfection or the "market for ideas". For example, in sectors such as biotechnology where 
patents are relatively effective and there exist "markets for ideas", cooperation with larger 
firms is more common, than in electronics where such conditions are absent -- here small 
firms have to try and compete with large firms head-on. 
The above are interesting insights, yet used mainly as case examples of some firms in 
some sectors. It might be useful to try to generalize such insights in the context of a model, 
which focuses on firms pursuing value capture from their innovation, and/or the innovation of 
others, in a way that accounts for differences in firm size and the role of IP. Interestingly, the 
aforementioned considerations almost coincide with the five underlying themes or the "open 
innovation" approach, identified by Chesbrough (2006). These five themes are the centrality 
of  the  business  model:  the  role  of  external  innovation  in  advancing  it,  the  problem  of 
diagnosis,  access  and  leverage  of  relevant  knowledge,  and  the  role  of  start-ups  and  new 
entrants and IP. 
In  what  follows,  we  present  a  simple  model  that  allows  for  the  aforementioned 
stylised issues, and which shows that differences in firm size is a major driving force behind   6 
firms decisions to "delegate" R to other firms, acquire it and then develop it. Large firms pool 
of existing knowledge (as captured by their patent portfolio) allows them to diagnose the 
requisite external knowledge for value capture, while the existence of multilevel bargaining 
ability, allows profit sharing with smaller firm, which addresses the problem of potential 
litigation. This seems to accord well with reality and may provide some explanation as to 
why many firms moved from "open" to "closed" and back to "open", innovation, as well as 
why small firms keep doing R, in the presence of possible infringement, and under which 
conditions would/should large firms allow or even encourage small firms to R, with an eye to 
then acquire and do the D. 
The notion of size, as captured in this case by the size of a firm’s patent portfolio, 
diversifies  this  paper from  a  wealth  of extant literature, which,  starting with  Gilbert  and 
Newberry (1982), examines the R&D incentives of an established incumbent who is faced 
with an innovative entrant. Our focus on size derives from the pioneering empirical work of 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004), who examine how firms build and use patent portfolios in 
defending their technology. In terms of intended contribution, we try to solve the apparent 
paradoxical move of many large firms, from "closed" to "open" innovation, alongside the 
apparently counterintuitive continued innovative efforts by smaller players, in the presence of 
potential infringement of their R by larger players use it for their D’. These two paradoxes 
have not been modelled before, at least to our knowledge. 
Structure-wise, Section 2 presents our simple model, while Section 3 has conclusions 
and policy implications. The Appendix discusses the case where multilevel bargaining is not 
present, and which leads to the emergence of litigation. 
2. Value capture from external innovation- a description of the "game"   7 
We start by assuming first for simplicity that there exist two firms i, j, that jointly 
operate  and  compete  in  the  same  industry.  The  role  of  i,  which  is  assumed  to  be  an 
established firm (e.g. Apple) is to create an innovation that if bundled to its existing products 
it allows it to develop a marketable product. As such, i has a choice. It can either actively 
carry out research in the hope of producing the innovation on its own (the R stage of R&D), 
or let (or encourage) j to go for it; where j is an innovative start-up firm of smaller size than i. 
In the latter case, after the innovation has been made and assuming that j decides to transfer 
and  share  the  innovation  with  i,  i  only  concentrates  on  the  development  stage  of  the 
innovation  (the  D  stage  of  R&D),  bundling  the  novel  features  of  the  innovation  into  an 
existing product. The iPod would be a case in point. 
The patent race literature examined the problem of who innovates in terms of the 
firm's ability to innovate and the cost of R&D; see Reinganum (1989). It is intuitive that any 
firm that feels competent enough to innovate (past all competition) and has low R&D cost 
will never face the above dilemma and always choose to develop the innovation on its own. 
Abstracting from firms' competencies and costs for the time being, we assume that both firms 
are equally capable to create the innovation and face the same research costs. This similarity 
between firms is only limited to research. The most important and costly part in forming a 
new innovative product, however, is not the research, but rather the development from the 
innovation  to  market.  It  is  on  the  development  stage  of  the  innovation  that  we  turn  our 
attention to. We concentrate on firm size, on policy variables that capture the economy's legal 
and entrepreneurial/bargaining attitude and the role of complementarities between the firms. 
In the above context, j is an innovative start-up firm, whose size is much smaller 
compared to that of i and which lacks its managerial and innovation development skills. For 
notational purposes i′s and j′s size is   and   respectively, where  > , and { , }≥1. 
Through firm size we aim to capture the well established notion in the literature that large   8 
firms are more capable in improving the already existing technology, creating a product of 
superior  market-ability.
iii Size in this context is not an output indicator.
iv The underlying 
assumption is that large established firms are more R&D prolific, having accumulated sizable 
patent portfolios (which attest to their innovative capabilities), in contrast to smaller firms 
who  have  yet  to  fully  develop  their  patent  portfolios.  In  brief,  size  is  centred  on  patent 
portfolios,  suggesting  a)  a  monotonic  relationship  between  the  firm's  size  and  its  patent 
portfolio, where b) the latter is indicative of the firm's capability to develop an innovation. 
Considering that the market on which the model focuses is binary, inhabited by large 
Apple type firms with large patent portfolios and smaller start-up firms, who have few or no 
patents, point a) is not unreasonable.
v Concerning point b), there is little doubt that small 
firms can be innovative, see Acs and Audresch (1987), Rosen (1991). However, large firms 
seem to be better equipped in building on these important innovations and in developing a 
marketable  product  (Rosen  1991).  Noting  that  this is  a  process  innovation  model,  where 
small and large firms compete for the development of a better product, the above implies that 
small firms are handicapped in comparison to larger firms. It is this handicap that the model 
attempts to establish through size differences.
vi 
As will become evident in the next Section, the model endows patent portfolios with 
the homogenising effects one expects from quasi-homogeneous inputs. This view contrasts 
with the observation that portfolios embrace many and some times diverse patents whose 
value appears to be independent from the other patents of the firm. However, there exists 
evidence to the contrary, by Bessen and Meurer (2006), who observe decreasing returns to 
scale between the size of a software firm's patent portfolio and the probability of winning a 
patent litigation suit.
vii In view of the above, we assume, following Eaton and Schmitt (1994), 
that  a  firm's  patents  are  interlinked  to  an  earlier  art  or  pluripotent  patent  that  acts  as  a 
common  root  to  most  patents  in  a  firm's  patent  portfolio.  In  a  nutshell,  a  firm’s  patent   9 
portfolio is  made up  of  patents  that  advance  a common  theme (having  a central  idea  or 
platform) on which they build on, or they elaborate upon. Therefore, a portfolio describes a 
quasi-unified technological territory.
viii 
In terms of a description of the game, i has the following set of choices: either to 
innovate on its own (strategy A), or not. If it decides otherwise j is the innovating firm, in 
which case (after innovation has taken place) i has two choices, it can either enter into an 
agreement  with  j  for  the  sharing  of  j′s  technology  (strategy  S),  or  try  to  infringe;  freely 
appropriating j′s technology.
ix In the latter case j can either pursue litigation (strategy L), or 
decide that it is best to abstain from any action (strategy N). It is worth noting that in reality 
litigation frequently leads to an out of court settlement in the form of an agreement for the 
sharing of the technology. In order to avoid duplication we abstain from modelling such a 
strategy. 
Elaborating on strategy S, a settlement for the exchange of technology between firms 
can take many different forms. For example, it may take the form of a licensing agreement 
with  royalty  payments,  or  a  cross-licensing  agreement.  Frequently  settlements  allow  for 
technology sharing through patent pools. In some cases, settlements may prove to be nothing 
more than a takeover agreement, or even take the form of a research joint venture (RJV). 
There seems to be no common rubric in describing the above settlement options. The only 
common ground between them is that they all involve some transfer of profits from one firm 
to  the  other.  Accordingly,  we  treat  strategy  S  as  a  transfer  of  profits  in  an  exchange  of 
technology. 
3. A simple model-based solution 
In what follows we first elaborate, as a benchmark, on the simplest case where there is 
no conflict (infringement) between the two firms, and we go on to describe each of the other   10 
strategies.  Accordingly,  consider  a  duopoly  in  which  i  and  j  produce  output    and  . 
Following  Dixit  (1977),  we  allow  for  a  simple  differentiated  demand  equation  that  is  a 
function of product prices, the level of technology incorporated into a product, as well as the 
degree  of  technological  sophistication  that  diversifies  the  product  from  its  substitutes. 
Assuming  a competitive  market, both i and j charge the  same price (which we use as a 
numeraire), allowing for a cross-price effect that is almost identical to the own-price effect. 
Subsequently, the effect of each firm's price cancels each other out, allowing the technology 
level  and  the  differences  in  the  technological  sophistication  between  products  to  be  the 
driving force of demand. 
In more detail, assuming a common fixed demand m, the demand that i and j face is 
,  .  The  { }≥1  indicate  the  technology  incorporated 
into each product as a result of further developing the original innovation, and the difference 
between the d′s aims at capturing differences in technological sophistication. Henceforth, 
, will be treated as simple monotonic functions of firm size and in the case there is no 
infringement  ,  . The intuition behind this formulation rests on the view of 
innovation as "standing on the shoulders of giants", i.e. resting on the existing prior art, 
which in this case is manifested through the firm's existing patent portfolio, as indicated by 
firm size. The above assumes that history (prior art) is an indicator of how capable a firm is 
in  developing  a  product,  therefore  a  fixed  term  (expressing  individual  capability)  is  not 
included. 
The  profits  of  each  firm  in  the  absence  of  conflict  are  , 
  where  ,    depict  development  and  production  cost  as  a 
negative function of the existing prior art. Overall, the benchmark case is captured by the 
following equations,   11 
                                           (1) 
             ,  ,            
which imply that   and  . 
We now concentrate on strategy N, where i is infringing j′s patents but j chooses to 
take no action. For brevity, the model operates under the assumption that infringement is 
comprehensive. Consequently, when infringement takes place i is infringing over the whole 
patent portfolio of j (making its patent portfolio  + ) and not just a set percentage   of j′s 
patent  portfolio.  Given  the  interconnectedness  of  patents,  claims  against  proprietary 
technology  should  cascade  to  all  the  patents  in  the  firm's  portfolio.  Therefore,  this 
comprehensiveness  is  not  unfounded.
x  Overall,  accounting  for  the  additional  developing 
capacity that i is endowed with by using j's technology,
xi equation (1) becomes, 
                          
(2) 
             ,  ,            
suggesting that  and  . 
Using equations (1), (2) we find that overall profits from infringement exceed profits 
from no infringement by  . This size-related difference captures the aforementioned 
assumption that large firms, having complementary skills, are more successful in developing 
and improving the already existing technology, creating a product of superior quality, and 
enhancing total market value created. One can view this difference as a bargaining surplus 
that i and j must split if they decide to pursue a settlement. Specifically, strategy S must 
involve (as in a Nash bargaining agreement) the collective decision to split the bargaining   12 
surplus  from  following  strategy  N  instead  of  B,  which  is 
.  We  model  this  decision  as  an  exogenous  one, 
where j gets an ε share of the surplus and i the remaining. Consequently, the profits that i and 
j derive are equal to the profits that they would get in any case (i.e.  ) plus the share of 
surplus that they bargain for, 
                                                                        
(3) 
The above prove to be equal to  ,  . 
Considering that settlement has been cast in terms of a Nash bargaining agreement, 
the exogeneity of ε begs for substantiation. For example, to derive a solution through Nash 
bargaining one needs to first define the revenues of each firm under the threat of litigation; 
which leads both sides to the bargaining table. Considering that such revenues must be a 
function of the probability that j has of winning the court case (which we define as µ) ε must 
be a function of µ. Therein lays the problem, as litigation (or the threat of it) is not the 
favourite means of persuasion in case of a disagreement. The overwhelming majority of IP 
conflicts are settled outside court, plus 95% of all filed cases are settled before the final 
hearing.  It  seems  that  firms  have  many  friction  points  and  in  reality  bargaining  is 
multidimensional as strategic attributes come to play, which cannot possibly be included in a 
single-dimensional  model,
xii  making  litigation  a  solution  of  last  (and  uncertain)  resort. 
Subsequently,  the  ability  of  µ  to  explain  ε  must  be  restricted  to  special  cases  only. 
Nevertheless, as we explain in the Appendix, even for these special cases, a Nash bargaining 
solution  (that  models  bargaining  under  the  threat  of  litigation)  does  not  alter  the  paper's 
results.   13 
In addition, holding epsilon as exogenous allows the  model to indirectly consider 
situations were more than one firms interact in the bargaining process. If this is true, the way 
the surplus  V is divided between the two firms may change in  a fashion that  cannot be 
captured by the endogenous solution that we provide in the Appendix. As the outcome of this 
change must also depend on parameters that are beyond the scope of this paper (e.g. type of 
competition, type of innovation, alternative strategies available to the firms, structure of the 
game,  availability  of  information  etc)  holding  epsilon  as  exogenous  allows  the  model  to 
indirectly consider a multitude of scenaria. 
Turning our attention to strategy L, if j wins the case with probability  , then 
j′s (i′s)profits must be equal to the profits that j (i)would get in the absence of infringement 
i.e.   ( ). To this we must add (subtract) the damages awarded, which courts consider as 
being equal to the outcome of a hypothetical settlement between the two firms. In this context 
a  settlement  payment  is  shown  to  be  .  On  the  other  hand,  if  i  wins  the  case  (with 
probability  ) then i′s and j′s profits are   and   respectively. Accounting for the 
above, when the case goes to court the profits of the firms are given by,
xiii 
                             (4) 
which prove to be equal to  ,  . 
If i decides to innovate on its own (strategy A) it faces no competition, subsequently 
its demand is  .
xiv Being the only innovator, i develops the   innovations on 
its own. Hence, j′s prior art is  , and j develops a product of quality   for a 
cost  . In total, equations (1) can be expressed as,   14 
                   
(5) 
From the above  . 
3.1. The dominant strategy 
The aim of this sub-section is to determine what strategy i and j are going to follow. 
In order to capture size differences   and  , where  . We first need to 
focus on the infringement subgame, finding when it is best for j to follow L instead of N. 
Accordingly, using   and   we find that L dominates N ( ) for all  , which 
implies that L always dominates N. Subsequently, if i infringes it will be faced with litigation. 
Since  in  the  subgame  j  always  prefers  to  litigate,  we  need  to  consider  i′s  choice 
between infringement (which leads to litigation) and settlement. Using   and   we find 
that L dominates S ( ) if  . Since    , and as long as   
S dominates L. Therefore, firm i, in the main game, is faced with the option to either innovate 
on its own or to settle. Accordingly, using  and   we examine the conditions under which 
strategy A dominates S, and we find that A dominates S if  . 
We plot the above inequality in Figure 1 for an m=10. Figure 1 divides the ε, σ space 
into  two  parts.  The  lower  right  part  (for  small  ε′s  and  large  σ′s)  is  the  area  where  S  is 
dominant. This result is based on the bargaining surplus V that the two firms share when they 
settle, which is an increasing function of σ. A greater σ increases V, while a lower ε increases 
i′s share providing additional incentives for i to pursue strategy S. 
3.2. Allowing for complementary assets   15 
The previous Section assumes the lack of any involuntary exchange between the two 
firms. In the realm of technology, this exchange is ever-present as ideas surpass barriers 
creating an osmosis that offers similar/substitute skills to innovators. As such, the prior art 
that constitutes the basis of i′s technology may spur innovative activity for j, and vice versa. 
In what follows, we study how such technology transfer affects the decision to delegate value 
creation. 
To account for the above, we assume that the firms' d has been enhanced due to such 
a technology transfer. This is an involuntary enhancement of skills and it does not constitute 
infringement. As such it can never legally provide the additional developing capacity that one 
acquires through infringement. Arguing for the simplest case of a linear increase in d, for the 
benchmark case  ,  , where   captures the intensity of the 
technology transfer process. Considering that firms that hold complementary technological 
skills should be more able to appreciate and leverage any ideas and technologies that they 
become aware of firms with such skills must be endowed with a greater  δ . Focusing on 
strategy N,   and   must be re-expressed as  ,  . For strategy 
A it suffices to say that, since there is no technology transfer, the   of equation (5) still 
applies. 
Pursuing the intuition outlined in the previous Section, and accounting for the above 
noted d′s, we determine that  , which is lower (by a factor of  ) than 
the   we derived in the previous Section. This difference is caused by the   increase in 
. Furthermore, the bargaining surplus is also reduced by a factor of  , becoming 
. Similarly, this reduction is the result of j′s additional development capacity 
.   16 
Regarding  the  game,  similar  to  Section  3,  L  dominates  N  for  all  ,  and  L 
dominates S if  . However, when comparing strategies A and S, A dominates S if, 
                                                                                        
(6) 
Since increases in δ reduce both 
N
i π  and V (lowering 
S
i π ), as equation (6) postulates, a 
higher δ must increase the right hand side of equation (6), enlarging the area under which S is 
dominant in Figure 1. Apparently, firms with a greater capacity to absorb the transferred 
technology (or put directly, which hold adequate complementary assets) seem better suited 
for such technology sharing. 
In conclusion, we should expect small firms to be both "encouraged" and willing to 
continue to pursue value creation through R, in markets where: a) the two firms have many 
friction points, allowing i to favourably negotiate a good deal; a low ε; b) i is a large firm or it 
holds sufficient complementary assets, allowing it to add extra value to the innovation; c) the 
two firms specialize in preferably different technologies and lack the substitute skills that can 
negatively  affect  their  bargaining  surplus.  In  other  words,  firms  should  "delegate"  value 
creation in technologies where they do not have their core expertise.  
The  above  reasoning  can  help  explain  contemporary  management  practice  among 
large firms who use an open innovation model for their R&D, delegating value creation to 
smaller firms. The case study of Intel, as presented by Chesbrough (2003, Ch 6) may be 
instructive in clarifying our contribution. He observes that "Intel looks outside first before 
determining what research activities to perform. …. Intel then employs corporate VC to build 
and extend the value chain of suppliers that it relies on to make complementary investments   17 
to  support  the  architecture."  (Chesbrough  2003,  Ch  6,  p130-131).  It  seems  that  Intel’s 
investment portfolio, which by 2002 consisted of 475 investments in portfolio companies 
worth $1.4, is the means (the friction points) that Intel uses to screen new and promising 
technologies while gaining sufficient leverage in future negations regarding its use. Put it 
differently, "Intel looks outside first before determining what research activities to perform. 
…. Intel then employs corporate VC to build and extend the value chain of suppliers that it 
relies on to make complementary investments to support the architecture" (Chesbrough 2003, 
Ch 6, p130-131).  
4. Concluding remarks, limitations, extensions and managerial practice 
Our  aim  was  to  respond  to  a  number  of  "paradoxes"  in  the  innovation  literature. 
Firstly, the failure of some firms to capture value from their in-house innovations. Second, 
the fact that most radical innovations take place by small firms with large ones focusing on 
less  risky  ones.  Third,  the  question  why  should  firms  be  prepared  to  forfeit  proprietary 
control of their innovations. Fourth, why should small firms continue to innovate, in the 
presence of possible infringement by large firms.  
Our answers are that there can exist a division of labour between large and small 
firms with the latter focusing on R, and with large firms focusing on D, that leverages their 
respective competencies.
xv In the presence of multi-level bargaining the share of benefits is 
satisfactory to both sides, not least because of the possibility of litigation, but also the fact 
that overall value creation is higher than when each firm does both R and D. In this context, 
firms can use open or closed innovation (or both) depending on circumstances that allow 
them to benefit from such an arrangement.   
Our results may also help explain the paradox of going from "open" to "closed" and 
back to "open". Starting from the last mentioned, innovation was originally open because   18 
there existed no (large enough) firms to "close" it. The emergence of managerial hierarchies 
allowed  closure.  "Closed"  has  disadvantages  too.  Once  firms  have  acquired  size  and 
capabilities that allow them to "open-up", while simultaneously capturing (more) value, they 
will be inclined to do so allowing (or even encouraging) other firms' to R.
xvi 
Going "open" also allows large firms to licence their non-value capturing R in order 
to capture further value from this as well as the further R that the R and D of others will 
create through the leveraging of their original R.
xvii On the other hand, in the presence of 
multilevel bargaining, small firms will be able to capture value from their R. Thus they will 
not need to be too protective of it and/or stop doing R, thereby undermining the sustainability 
of the R-creation process.  
Concerning managerial practice large firms could aim to do sufficient R so as to D the 
R  acquired,  sell  the  non-value  capturing  R  to  others  who  are  not  likely  to  emerge  as 
competitors in their main line of business and try to ensure that small firms will not feel 
obliged to compete, for fear of expropriation. Depending on their value capture capability, the 
choice of small innovative firms to a) sell their R, b) partner with larger firms and/or, c) grow 
internally will depend on the appropriability regime and their possession or otherwise of 
complementary skills and assets. 
Extending our analysis to capture the effects of the strength of appropriability regime, 
the  way  in  which  complementary  assets  can  be  acquired  (for  example  through  organic 
growth, takeover or partnership) and the impact of other factors on the choice of closed 
versus open innovation, not least changes in the external environment are potential avenues 
for future research. Their  absence also  limits the generality of our results. An additional 
limitation  concerns  accounting  for  the  type  of  sector  and  the  existence,  or  otherwise,  of 
markets for ideas, as these are known to impact on the choice of R, D or R&D. We very   19 
much hope to pursue further research on this exciting theme, and that our attempt here will 
motivate others to do so.   20 
Appendix - No multilateral bargaining leads to litigation 
Firms i and j bargain on how to split   in two shares   
and  , making their profits from settlement equal to  +  and  . Should the firms 
end  up  in  court  the  disagreement/threat  points  of  the  firms  are  the  respective  expected 
surpluses  from  litigation,    and  . 
Since V is the maximum value of the bargaining surplus, the Nash bargaining set is defined 
as,  . Considering that B is compact and convex, there is a 
unique  Nash  bargaining  outcome  that  solves, 
,  where  n>0  depicts  the  bargaining  power  of  i. 
Solving the above we find, 
 
Using the above   we can find the profits for all strategies. These indicate that 
strategy L dominates N for all  . Subsequently, when faced with infringement j always 
litigates.  Turning  our  attention  to  i,  when  faced  with  the  choice  to  infringe  (and  face 
litigation) or settle, S is the dominant strategy for all   Therefore, i is faced with the 
following choice: it either innovates on its own (strategy A) or it follows strategy S. However, 
A dominates S for all  . We plot this equation in Figure 2 for 
. 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                            
i We would like to thank P. Aghion, J. Beath, K. Binmore, R. Blundel, P. Rey, N. Savva, D. 
Teece, J. Tirole, D. Ulph, C. Velu, and participants of the UCL, IDEI University of Toulouse, 
and  Lancaster  University  Management  School  internal  seminar  series,  an  anonymous 
reviewer  of  this  journal  and  Guest  Editor  Joe  Mahoney  for  their  useful  comments  and 
suggestions on earlier drafts. The usual disclaimer applies. 
ii For an extensive critical assessment of Schumpeterian and non Schumpeterian views, see 
Freeman (1994), Castellacci et al (2005). Cohen and Klepper (1996) present stylized facts 
concerning R&D, innovation and size, as follows; " (I) the likelihood of performing R&D 
rises  with  firm  size;  (2)  R&D  and  firm  size  are  closely  and  positively  related  within 
industries; (3) R&D rises proportionally with firm size in most industries; (4) the number of 
patents or innovations generated per dollar of R&D declines with firm size." (p. 946). They 
go  on  to  suggest  that  "R&D  cost  spreading"  could  help  explain  all  four  regularities  and 
support the idea that a decline in R&D productivity with size is consistent with an advantage 
of size in R&D.  
iii See Rosen (1991) for an attempt to reconcile the observations that smaller firms make a 
disproportionate share of major innovations, while large ones tend to spend more on R&D (in 
absolute terms) but choose safer projects which add into their current methodology, rather 
than replacing it. 
iv The model’s focal point is the size of a firm’s extant patent portfolio at a given poi t in 
time.  In  this  sense  the  model  does  not  address  the  question  how  such  a  portfolio  was 
developed, or the extent to which it correlates well with the firm’s actual size.  
vTo  offer  an  example  of  the  empirical  findings  linking  firm  size  to  patent  portfolios, 
Audretsch (2002) indicates that large firms produce a larger number of patents per firm, 
while Verspagen  (1999)  finds  that  large  firms  generate  the  greatest  part of  the scientific 
literature that is referred to in Philips patents; see also Scherer and Ross (1991), and Acs and 
Audretsch (1987, 1988). 
vi This handicap will tend to be moderated by factors, such as the type of the industry and the 
use of skilled labour, see Acs and Audretsch (1987), as well as the type of innovation, degree 
of  uncertainty  and  firm  objective,  see  Damanpour  (1996).  See  also  Khan  and 
Manopichetwattana (1989) for an analysis of determinants of differential innovativeness of 
small firms, depending on "scanning", environmental dynamism and resource abundance.  
vii  As  they  argue,  "...the  idea  of  diminishing  returns  to  patent  portfolio  size  may  seem 
counterintuitive. After all, if two firms merge, pooling their patent portfolios, why should this 
affect the role of litigation per patent? But such a merger would affect the probability of 
winning a suit against a third firm". ; Bessen and Meurer (2006 p 23)   26 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
viii This idea is in line with Penrose’s concept of a "technological base" (or "a relatively 
impregnable base"), see Penrose (1959) and with extant managerial practice on "platforms" 
see Parker and Van Alstyne (2007). 
ix  We  only allow  i  to  infringe  on  j  because  the reciprocal  problem  does  not  add  further 
understanding  to  the  conditions  under  which  a  dominant  firm  allows  a  smaller  rival  to 
innovate in its stead. 
x If one concentrates on an x% of infringement, the final graph does not change its slope, it 
just moves in a parallel fashion. 
xi We keep  unaffected by the additional technology, as a reduction in cost (caused by the 
adaptation of j's infringed technology) can only strengthen i's profits making infringement 
even more profitable. This treatment of c allows the paper to fully concentrate on the firm's 
capacity to further develop the product. 
xii  For  example,  Barton  (1998)  argues  that  in  biotechnology,  an  industry  where  almost 
everyone  is  likely  to  be  infringing  everyone  else's  patents  (and  producers  amass  patent 
portfolios for strategic reasons) there is more incentive to sue outsiders seeking to enter the 
industry than to sue other major participants. The reason being that these participants can 
reply  in  kind.  This  strategic  component  is  also  discussed  by  Lanjouw  and  Schankerman 
(2004), who note that repeated interaction through courts may facilitate cooperation. 
xiii We aim to prove our point under the minimum assumptions required. Subsequently, we 
abstain from modelling litigation cost, which is considered to be lower for established firms. 
Such a cost would further strengthen a large firm's ability to freely appropriate a competitor's 
technology. 
xiv In this equation,   takes its minimum value of 1, and the price (the numeraire) does not 
cancel out as in the case when i faced competition. 
xv Note that this in itself could be seen as a form of innovation, concerning the "business 
model" of the firm involved. For an analysis of dominance and business model innovation in 
network industries, see Velu et al (2008). 
xvi Kelm et al (1995) support this idea by showing that shareholder value creation is affected 
mainly by the availability of technological competencies at the announcement stage but by 
both technology and market variables at the commercialisation stage.  
xvii Katz and Shapiro (1985) provide support for the argument that firms will tend not to 
licence major innovations but licence minor ones, if they are equally efficient. Moreover, in 
the presence of dissemination, Katz and Shapiro (1987) find that industry leaders will only 
tend to develop major innovations, if imitation is difficult. Gilford (1992) shows that the role 
of innovation will tend to depend among others on the degree of obsolescence. All these point 
to difficulties of the "closed innovation" model.     27 
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